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The social safety nets in Mexico and the United States rely heavily on food assistance pro-
grams to ensure food security and access to safe and nutritious foods. To achieve these general
goals, both countries’ programs are exclusively paid for out of internal funds and both target
low-income households and/or individuals. Despite those similarities, economic, cultural, and
demographic differences between the countries lead to differences in their abilities to ensure
food security and access to safe and nutritious foods. Mexico uses geographic and household
targeting to distribute benefits while the United States uses only household targeting. U.S. food
assistance programs tend to be countercyclical (as the economy expands, food assistance
expenditures decline and vice-versa). Mexican food assistance programs appear to be neither
counter- nor procyclical. Food assistance programs have little effect on the extent of poverty in
Mexico, while the opposite is true in the United States, primarily because the level of benefits
as a percentage of income is much lower in Mexico and a much higher percentage of eligible
households receive benefits from food assistance programs in the United States.
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Preface
Under the auspices of the Mexico Emerging Markets Program, the Economic Research Service
of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Mexican Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia y
Desarrollo Rural (SAGAR) established a project to compare food assistance programs in
Mexico and the United States. While a great deal of research has been conducted analyzing
each nation’s food assistance programs, there have been no studies comparing the two coun-
tries’ food assistance programs. This absence of studies has limited the crucial insights policy-
makers and researchers can obtain through such comparisons. This report represents the first
published contribution to this ongoing project.Summary
Food assistance programs are integral components of the social safety net in both Mexico and
the United States. About one in five Mexicans and one in six Americans receive benefits from
at least one federally funded food assistance program. This assistance helps ensure that people,
especially children, are food secure and have access to a safe and nutritious diet. To achieve
these general goals, both countries’ programs are internally funded, and both target benefits to
low-income households rather than to the general population. Despite those similarities, eco-
nomic, cultural, and demographic differences between the countries lead to differences in their
abilities to ensure food security and access to safe and nutritious foods. Here, we compare the
countries over three dimensions – the methods used to target benefits; the effect of macroeco-
nomic conditions on food assistance expenditures; and the effectiveness of food assistance pro-
grams in achieving their goals. 
These comparisons are particularly timely for policymakers in both countries because their
food assistance programs have undergone transformations in the past few years. In Mexico,
general food subsidies have, for the most part, disappeared and been replaced with food assis-
tance programs explicitly designed for low-income households. As part of this change, a new
groundbreaking and innovative program, Progresa, has begun. In the United States, the struc-
ture of food assistance programs has not changed, but their role in the social safety net has
taken on new importance. Previously, cash assistance recipients could receive aid for an indefi-
nite time period, but now time limits are placed on recipients. Food assistance programs, how-
ever, do not have such time limits and therefore will play an even larger role as people lose eli-
gibility for cash assistance or decide not to receive cash assistance due to the time limits.
We begin with a review of the five largest food assistance programs in Mexico: Progresa
(Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación), DICONSA (Distribuidora Compañia
Nacional de Subsistencias Populares (CONASUPO)), FIDELIST (Fideicomiso para la
Liguidación al Subsidio de la Tortilla), LICONSA (Leche Industrializada CONASUPO), and
DIF (Sistema Nacional para el Desarrollo Integral de la Familia). Five U.S. programs are also
reviewed: the Food Stamp Program, the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women,
Infants, and Children (WIC), the National School Lunch and Breakfast Programs, the
Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP), and the Food Distribution Program on Indian
Reservations.
In designing these programs, for a given amount of money, a country chooses methods of iden-
tifying recipients such that the intended beneficiaries receive aid while, at the same time, unin-
tended beneficiaries do not receive aid. We show, theoretically, how a country can minimize
these problems of “undercoverage” and “leakage” and then show how Mexico and the United
States actually try to minimize these problems through the structure of benefits, the usage of
nonhousehold based information, and the avoidance of negative incentives. The primary differ-
ence between the countries is in the use of geographic targeting. In general, Mexico first
decides on particular areas to target benefits and then, within those areas, further targets low-
income households. The United States, however, targets benefits based only on low-income sta-
tus and does not use any geographic information.
iv ❖  A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States Economic Research Service/USDABy targeting benefits, the goal of food assistance programs is to reach those most in need.
During recessions, the number of persons in need of such assistance generally increases. U.S.
food assistance programs are countercyclical. That is, as the economy expands, food assistance
expenditures decline and vice-versa. For Mexico, expenditures on the program appear to be
neither counter- nor procyclical. Mexico’s food assistance programs appear to be stable and not
influenced by changes in GDP or inflation.
An important question for evaluations of any food assistance programs is: Do these programs
improve the well-being of recipients?   We first review studies showing that U.S. food assis-
tance programs are effective in terms of alleviating food insecurity; enhancing nutritious diets;
and increasing food consumption. We then estimate how poverty rates in both countries might
be affected by the inclusion of food assistance programs. We first estimate poverty rates with-
out food assistance and then compare these rates with those that include food assistance. In
Mexico, food assistance programs do not reduce the incidence of poverty. By contrast, U.S.
food assistance programs reduce poverty by about 10 percent. The level of benefits as a per-
centage of income is much lower in Mexico than in the United States, and a much higher per-
centage of eligible households receive benefits from food assistance programs in the United
States than in Mexico.
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Food assistance programs in Mexico and the United States
are integral components of these nations’ social safety nets.
About one in five Mexicans and one in six Americans
receive benefits from at least one federally funded food
assistance program. This assistance helps ensure that people,
especially children, are food secure and have access to a
safe and nutritious diet. These programs have been reorga-
nized in recent years to reflect the countries’ changing
economies and policy goals.
Until recently, Mexico had universal subsidies for major
food products such as corn tortillas. Tortillas are a staple of
the Mexican diet, and government policy once ensured that
everyone had access to this basic food. Similar policies sub-
sidize the price of dahl in India and baguettes in France. In
Mexico, these subsidies for the most part have disappeared
and been replaced with food assistance programs explicitly
designed for low-income households. Of particular interest
is a new food assistance program, Progresa, which incorpo-
rates numerous insights from the development economics
literature. As Progresa expands, it will replace the other
food assistance programs.
Unlike Mexico, the U.S. food assistance programs have not
undergone major changes in recent years, but their relative
importance in the social safety net has changed. The
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) transformed Federal
welfare policy. The act replaced the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program with the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. While
AFDC was an entitlement program and matched State dol-
lars with Federal dollars, TANF imposes time limits and
work requirements on recipients and uses Federal block
grants (based on previous AFDC spending levels) rather
than matching funds. While PRWORA made large cuts in
the Food Stamp Program (the largest U.S. food assistance
program), its status as an entitlement program was main-
tained for almost all Americans, thus preserving the nutri-
tional safety net for almost the entire population. This nutri-
tional safety net (combined with the other food assistance
programs such as the School Lunch Program and the
Special Supplemental Feeding Program for Women, Infants,
and Children (WIC)) will become especially important dur-
ing the next recession and as time limits for TANF recipi-
ents are realized.
In this report, we begin with a brief review of the five
largest food assistance programs in Mexico: Progresa
(Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación), DICONSA
(Distribuidora Compañía Nacional De Subsistencias
Populares (CONASUPO)), FIDELIST (Fideicomiso para la
Liguidación al Subsidio de la Tortilla), LICONSA (Leche
Industrializada CONASUPO), and DIF (Sistema Nacional
para el Desarrollo Integral de la Familia). Five U.S. pro-
grams, chosen because of their size and/or parallels with
Mexican programs, are then reviewed: the Food Stamp
Program, the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for
Women, Infants and Children (WIC), the National School
Lunch and Breakfast Programs, the Emergency Food
Assistance Program (TEFAP), and the Food Distribution
Program on Indian Reservations. 
Demographic, economic, and cultural differences between
Mexico and the United States lead to different constructions
of these food assistance programs. We analyze the differ-
ences and the similarities between the programs over three
dimensions. First, we examine how beneficiaries are identi-
fied. After describing the targeting methods used in each
country, we consider how the countries construct their pro-
grams in terms of the level of benefits, the uses of non-
household-based information, and the avoidance of negative
incentives. Second, we analyze the response of the programs
to changing economic conditions. We show that while U.S.
food assistance programs tend to be countercyclical (that is,
as the economy expands, food assistance expenditures
decline and vice-versa), Mexican food assistance programs
appear to be neither counter- nor procyclical. Third, we
examine the effect of the programs on individuals’ well-
being. We review the literatures in terms of the effects of
food assistance programs on food insecurity, nutrition, food
consumption, and poverty. 
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in Mexico
The principles guiding the development of food assistance
programs in Mexico are found in the National Development
Plan 1995-2000. The objectives of the plan are to promote
equal opportunities and conditions of equality to ensure that
the population enjoys individual and social rights; to raise
the level of well-being and the quality of life; and to reduce
poverty and social exclusion. The efforts are oriented toward
the development of the productive capacity of individuals
and communities and are directed toward the regions with
the greatest development need.
The social development strategy has two approaches that are
necessarily inter-related:
1. Universal access policies concerning education, health,
social security, and housing.
2. Poverty reduction policies oriented toward the most 
vulnerable social groups and those whose living condi-
tions prevent them from having access to the benefits of
development.
One part of the plan is the Program to Overcome Poverty
1995-2000. The program seeks to reduce the incidence of
extreme poverty in the medium term, giving priority to the
regions and the groups that need it the most. Therefore, a
series of comprehensive and complementary actions are pro-
posed to support individuals and families during key
moments of their life cycle to break the intergenerational
transmission of poverty. To achieve this, the program is
based on three fundamental policies: development of coordi-
nated and relevant actions to increase the capacity of indi-
viduals and families; construction of basic municipal infra-
structure; and encouragement of productive activities that
increase income and employment. The goal is to integrate
these policies sufficiently for a comprehensive strategy to
overcome extreme poverty.
We now review the five largest food assistance programs in
Mexico: LICONSA, DICONSA, DIF, FIDELIST, and
Progresa. While DIF is an autonomous agency, the other
four programs are in the Secretaria de Desarrollo Social
(SEDESOL). Previously, LICONSA, DICONSA, and
FIDELIST were in the Secretaria de Agricultura (SAGAR).2
LICONSA
The oldest existing Mexican food assistance program,
LICONSA was started in 1965 to safeguard the health of
children. The LICONSA program provides milk powder and
liquid milk at subsidized prices to low-income families. In
1997, the milk program distributed 11 percent of total
domestic milk consumption, benefiting over 2 million chil-
dren in rural areas and 3.4 million children in urban areas.
The distribution mechanism is through “cards” that entitle
poor children living in marginal zones3 to buy 4 liters of
milk per child/per week at discounted prices. In Mexico
City, the allowance is for 8 liters of milk. In 1998, the price
of milk for program participants was 25 percent lower than
the market price. 
Beginning in 1991, LICONSA increased its coverage to
children 12 years of age and younger in low-income fami-
lies (children of up to 2 years of age can obtain infant for-
mula). The program previously had served children 5 years
of age and younger. LICONSA distributes milk through
LICONSA agents, DICONSA stores, and private retail
shops. LICONSA also supplies milk powder to DIF. 
DICONSA
DICONSA was created in 1972 to distribute basic com-
modities (corn, beans, rice, sugar, corn flour), powdered
milk (in cooperation with LICONSA), and tortilla products
at subsidized prices to people living in marginal urban and
rural areas. DICONSA’s operations have grown significantly
over time. In 1976, DICONSA operated 1,500 rural stores;
by 1997, there were 23,344 DICONSA rural stores, benefit-
ing 31.2 million consumers. Over 82 percent of total
DICONSA sales take place in rural areas, and 18 percent
occur in marginal urban areas and special programs. 
In 1995, DICONSA’s selling prices were 19 percent lower
than market prices in rural areas, and 13 percent lower in
urban areas. DICONSA also has a targeted program to
directly subsidize the price of corn tortillas through prefer-
ential prices to close to 5 million low-income consumers.
DICONSA’s programs also include the Rural Procurement
Program to supply subsidized basic commodities in rural
areas and the Urban Procurement Program (PAZPU) to sup-
ply basic commodities in the cities.
DIF
The National Scheme for the Integrated Development of the
Family (DIF) began in 1972 and was designed to increase
the nutritional intake and welfare of the poor. Currently DIF
manages five different food consumption programs: the
Food Rations Program (PRA), Food Assistance to Families
Program (PASAF), Popular Kitchens and Integral Services
Units (COPUSI), the School Breakfast Program, and the
Community Breakfast Program.
The most important, the Food Rations Program, provides
milk powder, corn tortillas, and beans to over 7.3 million
individuals, half of whom are children. The Food Assistance
to Families Program provides monthly food baskets to 1.7
million families in extreme poverty located in rural, indige-
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2 For a historical perspective on food assistance programs in Mexico, see
Yañez-Zazueta, 1997.
3Marginal zones are defined as relatively poorer areas in Mexico.nous, and marginal urban areas. The Popular Kitchens and
Integral Services Units Program provides an “integrated
package” of food, health, and educational services through-
out the country to rural and indigenous populations; the pro-
gram benefited 256,425 people in 1997. The School
Breakfast Program provides free breakfasts to school chil-
dren located in the poor districts of the four largest cities,
and to elderly, destitute, and handicapped people in social
assistance centers. In 1997, the program benefited 2.6 mil-
lion school children per day with 20 percent of the break-
fasts distributed in Mexico City. The Community Breakfasts
Program provides free breakfasts to children under 5 years
of age and expecting and lactating mothers in rural and
indigenous areas with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants. 
FIDELIST (Trust Fund for the Liquidation of
the Tortilla Subsidy)
In 1984, CONASUPO created the tortibonos food stamp
program, a targeted program to directly subsidize the price
of corn tortillas at preferential prices to low-income families
in urban areas. Until 1990, CONASUPO distributed torti-
bonos directly to 2.5 million families at prices below the
official consumer price ceilings (50 percent lower than the
retail price), principally through DICONSA retail stores in
low-income urban neighborhoods.
In 1990, the tortibonos program was replaced by the
Program to Subsidize the Consumption of Tortilla (Tortilla
sin Costo), to provide 2.1 million low-income households
with tortilla stamps to obtain 1 kilo of free tortillas per day
from the tortilla manufacturer. The free tortillas distributed
through this program represented 3 percent of the total
annual corn consumption in Mexico and about 50 percent of
the daily household consumption. In 1997, over 1.9 million
kilograms of tortillas were distributed. To control the vol-
ume distributed through tortibonos and the allocation of
subsidies, the program adopted the use of “smart electronic
cards” in 1992, implemented through DICONSA’s retail
stores and the Trust Fund for Tortilla Subsidy Payments
(FIDELIST). Since 1995, FIDELIST has been managed by
SEDESOL (Secretaria de Desarollo Social).
Progresa 
Progresa is the most recent food assistance program imple-
mented by the Mexican Government. Initiated in 1997, it
links food assistance to health and education programs.
Currently benefiting over 400,000 urban and rural families
in 12 States, the goal is for full coverage of the country
within the next few years. 
Progresa has three linked components:
1. Education
The Government provides scholarships and financial support
for school supplies to encourage children to attend school.
In addition, the Government plans to increase the coverage
and improve the quality of education by training teachers
and improving school equipment.
Scholarships are granted to each child in families covered
by Progresa. The scholarships include school equipment or
the financial support to obtain them and are given every 2
months throughout the school year. The higher the grade,
the higher the amount distributed. Beginning in the first
grade of secondary school, girls receive a higher allowance
than boys. The scholarships are meant to ensure school
attendance and to reduce the incentives to seek jobs at a
young age or, in the case of girls, to do housework before
completing their basic education.
2. Health
The coverage of health services is enhanced by equipping
and training health-care providers. A basic free health ser-
vices package is provided, and a nutritional supplement is
given to all pregnant women and nursing mothers and to
children less than 2 years old to decrease the number of
undernourished children. Health self-care by the families is
fostered through education and training in the areas of
health, nutrition, and hygiene.
3. Nutrition
Financial support of 110 pesos per month is granted to the
families to supplement their income. To help ensure that the
money is used for food, this money is distributed to the
female head of the household. This amount is indexed to
inflation so the purchasing power remains the same.
Through education and information, families are encouraged
to spend this money in a manner that will yield the most
improvement in nutrition and well-being. Beneficiaries must
make compulsory visits to health services, and parents must
attend health courses. 
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in the United States
We now review five food assistance programs in the United
States: the Food Stamp Program, WIC, the National School
Lunch and Breakfast Programs, the Emergency Food
Assistance Program (TEFAP), and the Food Distribution
Program on Indian Reservations. In contrast with Mexico,
where the food assistance programs are under SEDESOL
(roughly the equivalent of the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services), all U.S. food assistance programs are
funded by the Department of Agriculture (USDA). Food
assistance programs were originally established, in part, to
distribute surplus commodities and, hence, served an addi-
tional role of supporting U.S. farmers. While some food
assistance programs directly support domestic agriculture by
distributing surplus commodities (such as the TEFAP pro-
gram, described below) or by stipulating that only com-
modities produced in the United States can be purchased
(such as the School Lunch Program), most food assistance
programs (including the largest one, the Food Stamp
Program) serve this role only indirectly. Nevertheless,
because these programs do increase food consumption, sup-
port for them among farmers and others in agriculture
remains high and increases political support for the food
assistance programs run by USDA.4
Food Stamp Program
The Food Stamp Program is by far the largest U.S. food
assistance program, serving approximately 18.2 million
individuals in 1999. Children are the primary recipients of
food stamp benefits: over half of all food stamp recipients
are children, and 60 percent of food stamp households
include children. The modern version of the program began
as a pilot project in 1961 and became a nationwide program
in 1974. This cornerstone of food assistance programs
works under the principle that everyone has a right to food
for themselves and their families and, hence, with a few
exceptions, this program is available to all citizens who
meet income and asset tests. Participants receive either
paper “coupons” or an Electronic Benefit Transfer card for
the purchase of food in authorized, privately run retail food
outlets selling food to participants and nonparticipants.
While authorized stores may also sell nonfood products,
food stamps cannot be used to purchase nonfood items such
as soap, toiletries, household paper products, prepared
foods, or medicines.5
The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program
for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC)
Nutritious supplemental foods, nutrition education, and
referrals to other important health and social services are
provided to low-income pregnant and postpartum women,
infants, and children up to the age of 5 through the Special
Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and
Children (WIC). About 7 million people participate in WIC
in any month: 3.8 million children, 1.9 million infants
(under age 1), and 1.7 million women. WIC was established
on a permanent basis in 1974. The types of food a woman
can purchase with WIC coupons for her own or her chil-
dren’s consumption are restricted. To meet the needs of
pregnant and lactating women and their children, the foods
include iron-fortified infant formula and infant cereal, iron-
fortified adult cereal, fruits and vegetable juices rich in vita-
min C, eggs, milk, cheese, peanut butter, and dried beans
and peas. These foods are generally high in protein, calci-
um, iron, vitamin A, and vitamin C, nutrients frequently
lacking in the diets of the program’s target population.
Fewer food outlets accept WIC coupons than accept food
stamps. About 46,000 merchants nationwide and some farm-
ers markets are authorized to accept WIC coupons.
The National School Lunch 
and Breakfast Programs
The National School Lunch Program provides nutritionally
balanced, low-cost or free lunches to children in kinder-
garten through 12th grade. Each school day, about 26 mil-
lion children receive lunches through the program. The
amount a child pays depends upon the child’s household’s
income: about 45 percent receive free meals; 10 percent
receive reduced-price meals; and 45 percent pay near-full
price. The program was started in 1946 to encourage chil-
dren’s consumption of nutritious food and to provide an out-
let for surplus commodities. To ensure the consumption of
nutritious foods, schools must meet Federal nutrition guide-
lines. Approximately 17 percent of the total dollar value of
food in school lunches comes from 60 different kinds of
foods from agricultural surplus; the rest comes from vendors
chosen by the schools. Virtually all public and nonprofit pri-
vate schools (94,000) participate in the program.
The National School Breakfast program is a smaller, newer
program. Each school day, about 7 million children receive
breakfasts through the program, breakfasts designed to pro-
vide at least one-fourth of the daily recommended levels for
protein, calcium, iron, vitamin A, vitamin C, and calories.
As with school lunches, the amount a child pays depends on
household income, but a much higher percentage of partici-
pants receive free meals: 80 percent receive free meals; 5
percent receive reduced-price meals; and 15 percent pay
near-full price. The high percentage of students receiving
free meals is partly a function of the program’s larger pres-
ence in low-income schools. The program was made perma-
nent in 1975. Like the National School Lunch Program,
breakfasts must meet nutrition requirements, but the pro-
gram does not mandate specific foods to be offered. Unlike
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4For more on the increase in food consumption due to food stamps and
its resultant effect on the agricultural sector, see Kuhn, et al., 1996.
5The information used in this and the following descriptions for U.S.
food assistance programs can be found in various issues of Food Review
and on the Food and Nutrition Service’s home page,
http://www.fns.usda.gov/fns/.the lunch program, agricultural surpluses are not used.
About 70,000 schools participate in the program.
The Emergency Food Assistance Program
(TEFAP)
TEFAP is a Federal program that supplements the consump-
tion of low-income households through the provision of
free, healthful foods. In the course of a year, the program
serves about 3.5 million households. In this program, food is
purchased, processed, and packaged by the USDA, shipped
to States, and then distributed to local organizations such as
food banks and soup kitchens. The types of foods distrib-
uted include canned and dried fruits, fruit juice, canned veg-
etables, meat, poultry, fish, rice, grits, cereal, peanut butter,
nonfat dry milk, dried egg mix, and pasta products. TEFAP
began in 1981 with the goal of reducing Federal food inven-
tories and storage costs by assisting the needy. 
Food Distribution Program on Indian
Reservations
This program distributes foods to low-income households
living on Indian reservations and to Native American fami-
lies living near reservations. About 123,000 families partici-
pate in the program in each month. This program is part of
the Food Stamp Program, designed as an alternative for
families without easy access to foodstores. Each month, a
household receives a food package weighing between 50
and 75 pounds, containing meats, vegetables, fruits, dairy
products, grains, and cereals. The USDA purchases and
ships the foods through six State agencies and 94 Indian
Tribal Organizations. These agencies distribute the food,
determine applicant eligibility, and provide nutrition educa-
tion in 218 Indian communities.6
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6There are other assistance programs in the United States for low-income
households. These include programs to help with housing (such as public
housing projects and Section 8 housing), to help with medical insurance
(Medicaid), and cash assistance programs (the largest is Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)). These programs affect food con-
sumption by enabling households to reallocate money from other necessi-
ties like housing and through the provision of extra money which can be
used for purchasing food.Identification of Recipients
Countries with a limited amount of money allocated to
improving the well-being of poor residents must design
effective identification methods to ensure that benefits are
distributed in the most cost-effective manner possible while
still reaching the intended beneficiaries. The goals of food
assistance programs can be many. Most food assistance pro-
grams are designed to improve nutrition and ensure that
people have enough food to eat. These goals can lead to
other results, including a redistribution of resources to poor
households, an alleviation of the negative effects of econom-
ic downturns, and a population more aware of nutrition.
There are also many other potential goals not directly relat-
ed to food consumption including political stability and the
reduction of agricultural surpluses. To compare the targeting
programs of Mexico and the United States, we begin with a
general theoretical framework that assumes one goal of food
assistance programs is to alleviate food insufficiency.
Consider a country with a fixed amount of money, T, for
nutrition programs. The country gives food assistance
through a vector of transfers, t, to all or some residents.7
The extent of food insufficiency is measured by a food suffi-
ciency index, F(y; z) where y is a vector of food consump-
tion levels for all households and z is a minimum food con-
sumption level below which households are defined as mal-
nourished. The food sufficiency index could be constructed
in a manner similar to poverty indexes (for example, the
Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke measure (1984); Sen’s poverty
index (1974)).
If the yi’s are observed, a country faces the following mini-
mization problem:
min F(y+t;z) subject to
where the ti’s are the elements of t. The solution to this
problem is
tp*=t(y,z,T).
and each household, taking z and T as fixed, will receive the
transfer, tpi*=t(yi).8 This is called perfect targeting at the
household level.9
In most cases, however, perfect targeting is not possible. In
response, countries will minimize expected food insufficien-
cy with a vector of observable variables, x, that are correlat-
ed with y. The new minimization problem is then
min E[F(y+t;z)] subject to               , given f(y|x) and X
where the matrix X is the set of observations on x for all
households in the population. The general solution to this
can be represented by a functional t*:
t*=t(X, z, T),
which, for a given z and T, can be simplified to
t*=t(X).
Any household with observed characteristics, xi, will receive
the transfer ti*=t(xi). The vector t* will minimize the
expected food insufficiency level in the country.
Neither Mexico nor the United States (nor any other country
for that matter) is able to perfectly target transfers to house-
holds using the function t(yi) and both instead use t(xi). In
choosing t(xi), countries consider the relative benefits and
costs of various plans (see Grosh, 1994, p. 7-14). These ben-
efits and costs are measured in terms of leakage and under-
coverage. Leakage occurs when transfers are received by
households that are not in need of assistance (as defined by
the goals of the program). Undercoverage occurs when
transfers are not received by the intended households. 
The benefits to targeting are relatively obvious in terms of
the theoretical structure above: for a fixed T, a country can
most effectively improve the well-being of poor households
by concentrating resources on those most in need.
Conversely, once a country decides on who should be
receiving assistance, identifying them accurately helps a
country minimize the amount of T needed to achieve its
goal.
There are four main costs to targeting.10 First, there are
administrative costs to identifying eligible households not
present with universal food subsidies (i.e. food assistance
benefits that are available to everyone without restrictions).
Second, there are costs borne by recipients in applying for a
subsidy. For example, the cost in time to negotiate the appli-
cation process; the financial cost of getting to the welfare
office; and the opportunity cost of lost wages when applying
for benefits. Third, households may change their behavior in
response to the identification criteria. A household just
above the eligibility cutoff in terms of income, for example,
would qualify for the program if the earners in the house-
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7Our theoretical framework is similar to Glewwe, 1992. Consistent with
papers in the poverty alleviation through targeted benefits literature, he
uses poverty as defined through income deficits from a poverty line.
Because the usual concern with food assistance programs is to ensure that
people have enough food to eat and are well-nourished, we examine the
alleviation of food insufficiency in this report. Other concepts such as
undernutrition could be used instead. For more on targeting of support to
low-income households, see Székely, 1997; de Walle and Nead, 1995;
Ravallion, 1989; Ravallion and Chao, 1989; and Besley and Kanbur, 1988.
8It is possible that for some households, tpi=0. In fact, for the programs
discussed below, this is the case.
9Perfect targeting at the household level does not imply perfect target-
ing at the individual level. There may be individuals in ineligible house-
holds in need of assistance. Even if the intended households receive the
benefits, due to intra-household allocation decisions, not everyone in the
household may receive the benefits in the intended amounts. (See








10Analyses of food assistance programs in Egypt (Ali and Adams,
1996) and Jamaica (Jacoby, 1997) have found that universal subsidies can
achieve similar outcomes as targeted subsidies. This can occur if, for exam-
ple, the program provides “inferior foods” that nonpoor persons are less
likely to consume. Neither Mexico nor the United States uses universal
subsidies, so we do not consider the relative efficacy of universal versus
targeted programs.hold scaled back the number of hours they worked. While
this improves the household’s welfare by increasing the
leisure time of wage earners, such households were not the
intended beneficiaries when the government established the
eligibility criteria. In response, the government is therefore
forced to spend more money than it would have otherwise
and/or cut back on the number of recipients. Fourth, when
geographical targeting is used, some nonrecipients may
move into the targeted area so as to receive benefits. This
outcome may have desirable features insofar as otherwise
poor nonrecipients are now covered, but if nonpoor house-
holds also move into the targeted area to receive benefits,
the Government may be forced to reduce the amount avail-
able to poor households and/or to increase the cost of the
program. 
A country’s choice of t(x) and T is clearly influenced by its
available resources. The United States is much wealthier
than Mexico. Based on current exchange rates, the per capi-
ta 1997 U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) was $29,326,
while it was $4,298 in Mexico. Using purchasing power par-
ity prices, the gap narrows somewhat: $29,326 versus
$7,697. The United States, therefore, if it is so inclined, has
a lot more money available for food assistance programs.
This additional income means that more sophisticated tar-
geting methods t(x) are possible and T can be larger. This
should be noted as we now review how t(x) is chosen for the
three largest U.S. food assistance programs and for the
Mexican food assistance programs. 
U.S. Food Assistance Programs
Food Stamp Program
Households have to meet three financial criteria to qualify
for the Food Stamp Program: the gross income test, the net
income test, and the asset test. A household’s gross income
before taxes in the previous month must be at or below 130
percent of the poverty line ($1,479 per month in fiscal year
1999 for a three-person household, the most common food
stamp household). Households with disabled persons or
headed by someone over the age of 60 are exempt from this
test (although they must still pass the net income test). After
passing the gross income test, a household must have a net
monthly income at or below the poverty line. Net income is
calculated in the following manner. A standard deduction is
subtracted from a households’ gross income. Households
with earnings from the labor market deduct 20 percent of
these earnings from their gross income. Households incur-
ring expenses for child care and/or care for disabled depen-
dents can deduct up to some limit. A medical deduction for
expenses above $35 per month and a shelter deduction for
costs in excess of 50 percent of a household’s net income
(computed before the shelter deduction) are also used. (The
medical deduction is only available to households with
elderly or disabled members.)  The shelter deduction is
capped except for elderly or disabled households. Finally,
net-income-eligible households must meet an asset test. All
net-income-eligible households with assets less than $2,000
qualify for the program ($3,000 for households headed by
someone over age 60). The value of a vehicle above $4,650
is also considered an asset unless it is used for work or for
the transportation of disabled persons. The value of a home
is not considered an asset.
Recipients of food stamps are categorically eligible for WIC
and the School Lunch and Breakfast programs, if they also
meet the other nonincome requirements of the program. As
seen in the income eligibility tests of these other programs,
the converse does not hold. 
The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for
Women, Infants, and Children (WIC)
To qualify for WIC, three criteria must be met. First, indi-
viduals must fall into one of four categories: pregnant
woman, postpartum woman, infant under the age of 1, or
child between the ages of 1 and 4. Second, gross household
income in the previous month must be less than 185 percent
of the poverty line. Participants in the Food Stamp Program
or Medicaid are automatically income eligible. Third, recipi-
ents must be nutritionally “at risk.” Two major types of
nutritional risk are recognized: medically based risks (such
as anemia, underweight, maternal age, history of pregnancy
complications, and/or poor pregnancy outcomes) and diet-
based risks such as an inadequate dietary pattern. This
assessment, based on Federal guidelines, is made by a
health professional, that is, a physician, nutritionist, or
nurse. 
Unlike other U.S. food assistance programs, WIC is not an
entitlement program and, therefore, funding may not be
available so that all eligible persons can receive benefits.
Once a local WIC agency has spent all its funds, rationing
occurs based on the following priority levels (in descending
order): pregnant women, breast-feeding women, and infants
determined to be at nutritional risk because of a nutrition-
related medical condition; infants up to 6 months of age
whose mothers were at nutritional risk during pregnancy;
children at nutritional risk because of a nutrition-related
medical condition; pregnant and breast-feeding women and
infants at nutritional risk because of an inadequate dietary
pattern; children at nutritional risk because of an inadequate
dietary pattern; and nonbreast-feeding, postpartum women
at nutritional risk. 
The National School Lunch Program
Any student at a school participating in the School Lunch
Program can receive free or reduced-price lunches. About
92 percent of all students have access to these meals with
near universal access in public schools. Children from
households earning less than 130 percent of the poverty line
can receive free meals; children from households earning
between 130 and 185 percent of the poverty line can receive
meals for 40 cents; and households earning more than 185
percent of the poverty line do not receive any reduction in
the cost (although even these meals are subsidized to some
extent due to the use of surplus agricultural foods).
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it is very unlikely that a child could receive benefits from
both programs. However, a family can potentially receive
benefits from both programs.
Mexico’s Food Assistance Programs
LICONSA
Children under the age of 12 who live in families with
incomes below 2 times the minimum salary (a commonly
used poverty line in Mexico) qualify for subsidized milk in
the LICONSA program. The participation of over 10,900
dairies ensures milk availability.
DICONSA
DICONSA’s target population is families with incomes of
less than 2 times the minimum salary living in rural commu-
nities of less than 2,500 inhabitants whose residents (a)
request assistance and (b) have the majority of the popula-
tion with incomes below two-times the minimum wage.
Access to this program for the distribution of basic com-
modities is facilitated through 23,000 stores, 332 warehous-
es, and 3,400 vehicles for distribution and supervision.
DIF
Everyone residing in a targeted community qualifies for the
benefits of DIF. Targeting of DIF depends on an “index of
social vulnerability” composed of five components — (1)
infant mortality rates, (2) illiteracy rates, (3) malnutrition
rates, (4) the number of indigenous persons in an area, and
(5) the number of postpartum women who are unable to
breast-feed. To establish the index, DIF first uses official
statistics, then DIF agents talk with local officials to estab-
lish the statistics’ veracity. The goal is to reach the most
poverty-stricken households; so areas scoring highest on this
index are served by DIF.
FIDELIST
Families earning less than two times the minimum salary
and without a telephone or car qualify for FIDELIST. 
Progresa
The selection process of beneficiaries for Progresa is deter-
mined by income and other factors, a process clearly stated
in the program’s guidelines. A household is defined as a
group of people (related or unrelated) living in the same
house, sharing food expenses, and cooking in the same
kitchen.
The identification of beneficiaries of Progresa is carried out
in three stages. The first consists of a geographic targeting
process to determine the most marginal localities with rela-
tively easy access to health services and schools. Second, a
census of socioeconomic information of each household in
all the selected localities is carried out to identify the benefi-
ciaries of the program. Third, once the list of beneficiaries is
completed, it is presented to the communities in meetings to
rectify any improper inclusion or exclusion of beneficiaries. 
The geographic targeting process is based on the Indice de
Marginación. The index is based on, for any region, the per-
centage of illiterate population age 15 or more; the percent-
age of  households without water services, drainage, elec-
tricity, or floors; the average number of inhabitants per room
in households; and the percentage of the population
employed in the primary sector (mainly manufacturing and
services industries). 
The second step in the targeting process is based on the
analysis of socioeconomic information of each household in
the regions selected by the Indice de Marginación.
Beneficiaries must also be considered poor. The information
obtained through the socioeconomic census of each house-
hold was designed to include measures of poverty. These
variables are household structure, individual characteristics,
occupation, income of each member of the household, gov-
ernment support programs received by the members of the
household, migration, health of the members of the house-
hold, physical characteristics of the house, use of the land,
and the number of farm animals.
The consolidation of the list of eligible households by local-
ity takes place in a community meeting attended by the
female head of the household and other members of the
community. The input of the community in determining the
final list of beneficiaries is important and ensures that all
eligible households are included.
During this community meeting, the basic guidelines are
reviewed as well as the responsibilities of the beneficiaries,
such as compulsory visits to the health center and children’s
school attendance. The community is in charge of the con-
trol and surveillance of the program. The benefits of
Progresa can be suspended temporarily or permanently if
the beneficiaries do not fulfill their responsibilities. After 3
years, people may be rotated off the program to allow other
community members to participate.
The objective of targeting is to ensure that the poorest fami-
lies receive the benefits. Because financial resources for
food assistance programs are insufficient to reach all house-
holds living in extreme poverty, the Government ensures
that Progresa does not overlap with other Government food
and education support; so beneficiaries of Progresa cannot
participate in other food assistance programs. This rule is
consistent with the goals of the Mexican Government. As
Progresa expands, it is going to replace the other programs.
In other words, the other programs are not going to be able
to replace beneficiaries lost to Progresa by going to other
parts of the country not served by Progresa or by changing
their eligibility criteria to include more families. Poor
households who receive no benefits from Progresa could
theoretically receive benefits from the four other programs.
The extent of overlap is unknown.
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Over Three Dimensions
We now compare Mexican and U.S. food assistance pro-
grams over three dimensions related to targeting: (1) the
structure of benefits, (2) the uses of nonhousehold-based
information for targeting, and (3) the possible negative
incentives produced by the programs.
Structure of Benefits
In Mexico, once a family is deemed eligible for food assis-
tance, its level of benefits is fixed. In the United States, the
amount of assistance a family receives for WIC, TEFAP, and
the Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations is
also fixed. The benefits under the National School Lunch
and Breakfast Programs and the Food Stamp Program, how-
ever, are inversely related to income, although for the for-
mer, there are only three income categories. In terms of the
theoretical structure above, if ti(xi)* > 0, then ti(xi)* is inde-
pendent of xi for the fixed-benefit programs; for the other
programs, if ti(xi)* > 0, ti(xi)* depends on xi.
A fixed benefit level reduces the administrative cost of tar-
geting because the only information needed is whether or
not a household is eligible. For example, Mexico has no
need to know whether a household without a car or tele-
phone earns 1 or 1.5 times the minimum wage—in both
cases a household qualifies for FIDELIST. However, for the
U.S. Food Stamp Program, for example, greater detail is
needed to set the benefit level. While the need for greater
detail does increase the administrative costs, there are two
primary advantages to using a benefit level inversely related
to, say, income. First, the marginal benefit to a peso of assis-
tance is, under reasonable assumptions, higher for house-
holds with incomes far below the poverty line than those
closer to the poverty line. In other words, it is a more effi-
cient way to allocate scarce resources. Second, the disincen-
tive effects of a variable benefit level are lower than for a
fixed benefit level. Consider an ineligible individual who,
with a small decrease in the number of hours worked, will
become eligible. If there is a fixed benefit level, a small
decrease in the number of hours worked may actually lead
to a higher total income. If there is a properly constructed
variable benefit level, however, a small decrease in the num-
ber of hours will not lead to a higher total income.
Uses of Nonhousehold-Based Information
In the theoretical framework above, we presumed that
households were the intended beneficiaries of food assis-
tance programs, and, with the exception of DIF, programs in
both countries use at least some information at the house-
hold level to identify beneficiaries. However, in both coun-
tries, the vector x can also include information not necessar-
ily at the household level. 
Some programs use more disaggregation to identify benefi-
ciaries by targeting benefits to individuals within house-
holds. WIC does use the income of households to identify
eligible recipients, but it also uses information about the
women, infants, and/or children within the households who
are potential beneficiaries. For example, nutritional risk is
an eligibility criterion for the women, infants, and children.
Others in the household could be at nutritional risk, but they
are not eligible. U.S. school meal programs use household
income to decide on the cost of meals, but only school-age
children in schools are eligible for benefits. In Mexico,
Progresa’s scholarship program is for school-age children,
and its benefits are further targeted by gender with girls
receiving more benefits than boys. LICONSA targets bene-
fits to children under the age of 12. This further disaggrega-
tion allows for more precision in reaching the intended ben-
eficiaries. All members of households benefit insofar as
money previously spent on now-covered expenses is freed
up for other expenditures.
Unlike the United States, Mexico uses information aggregat-
ed beyond the household level to identify beneficiaries. All
food assistance programs in Mexico use some geographic
targeting. By using more aggregation, the administrative
costs of providing food assistance is decreased in at least
two ways. First, by screening out large categories of per-
sons, the cost to certifying the eligibility of a smaller num-
ber of potential recipients is lowered. For example, Progresa
first decides on what areas are most in need of assistance
and, after this decision, individuals are targeted. This
method reduces the costs of ascertaining eligibility for the
Government. Second, the costs to providing the services
themselves are lessened. Consider the case of DICONSA,
which incurs both capital and labor costs. By restricting the
benefits to limited areas, the capital investment is dimin-
ished because the Government does not have to establish
and staff stores in all locales. The costs to families can also
be less. Suppose the Government, instead of targeting geo-
graphically, decided instead to establish the same number of
DICONSA stores distributed randomly across the country.
This alternative location strategy would lead to an increase
in travel and opportunity costs for the average poor family.
While there are advantages to geographic targeting, the pri-
mary disadvantage is the undercoverage that occurs because
needy individuals not in the targeted area will not receive
benefits. Simulations for Mexico show that if only State-
level information is used, the undercoverage rate is 59.3 per-
cent; if municipal information is used, it is 42.3 percent; and
if locality information is used, it is 37.3 percent (Baker and
Grosh, 1994; table 7). By no means should these be inter-
preted as the actual extent of undercoverage: they are based
on data from 1984; Mexico uses more than just geographic
targeting; and the simulations presume a fixed amount of
money available to poor households – but that fixed amount
of money is not based on the actual amount of money avail-
able. Thus, these simulations should be seen as only an indi-
cation of the relative effectiveness of hypothetical targeting
schemes. 
Compared with the United States, poverty in Mexico is
more concentrated in rural areas. This concentration is the
primary reason that most programs in Mexico use the
urban/rural distinction to target benefits more extensively
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holds live in extreme poverty conditions.11 Of those poor
households, 1.7 million are in urban areas and 2.5 million in
rural areas. Because the distribution of Mexico’s population
between urban and rural areas is 73 percent in the cities and
27 percent in rural areas, poverty is much more common in
rural areas. (For more on the rural/urban poverty differen-
tial, see Kelly, 1999.) In the United States, poverty is more
evenly distributed. The poverty rate for persons outside
metro areas was 15.9 percent in 1997 versus 12.6 percent
inside metro areas (Dalaker and Naifeh, 1998). Using non-
geographical distinctions one can see sharp disparities
between groups in poverty rates, however. For example, sin-
gle mothers with children have a poverty rate of 31.6 per-
cent, while married couples with children have a poverty
rate of 5.2 percent. While the United States has not targeted
food stamp benefits based on these nongeographical distinc-
tions, it has structured access to food assistance programs
based on this information. For example, prior to PRWORA,
recipients of AFDC, a program for single parents with chil-
dren, were categorically eligible for food stamps. As a con-
sequence, they did not have the burden of establishing
income eligibility for food stamps.
The relation of the food assistance participation rate to the
poverty rate by State is one way to view the effectiveness of
a country’s targeting methods. The poverty rate and the par-
ticipation rate are displayed by State for Mexico in figure
1.12 The States are in ascending order of poverty. There
appears to be very little connection between State poverty
rates and food assistance participation. For example, in
Oaxaca, a State with a poverty rate of 63 percent, only 9
percent of residents participate in at least one food assis-
tance program. Conversely, in the Distrito Federal, a State
with a relatively low poverty rate of 28 percent, 36 percent
of residents participate in at least one food assistance pro-
gram. We provide a more detailed look at the targeting
methods used in the food assistance programs in the section
on “Food Assistance and Poverty Rates” below. 
































































































































































































































































































































Average State poverty rate is 43.2 percent
Average State participation rate is 19.3 percent
Source: Conteo de Poblacion y Vivienda.
Figure 1
Mexican food assistance participation rates and poverty rates, 1995, by State
Percent
Note: See appendix A for more detail.
11Extreme poverty is defined as not having enough resources for access
to the goods contained in the official list of basic products that allows for
the adequate performance of daily activities.
12For a discussion of how the participation and poverty rates were cal-
culated and the information source used for this analysis (Instituto
Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informita, 1997) see Gundersen and
Kelly, 1999. The participation rate is calculated as the percentage of house-
holds participating in at least one food assistance program. Appendix A 
has a table for all States in Mexico. Appendix B has a table for all the
United States.A similar exercise for the Food Stamp Program in the
United States is in figure 2. There are two major differences
between the United States and Mexico in terms of the food
assistance/poverty relation. First, the difference in poverty
rates across States is much less in the United States, from 5
percent in New Hampshire to 18 percent in Mississippi
whereas in Mexico the range is from 21 percent in Baja
California (Norte) to 63 percent in Oaxaca. Second, while
not exact, food stamp participation rates appear to be more
correlated at the State level with poverty rates in the United
States. This closer correlation between poverty rates and
food stamp participation rates in the United States may be
due to three reasons. First, food stamps are an entitlement
program, while none of the food assistance programs in
Mexico are entitlement programs. Second, the costs to reach
some of the poorest areas in Mexico are very high due to
underdeveloped transportation systems. As a consequence,
administrators of food assistance programs may decide not
to serve such areas because the marginal costs of serving
them exceed the marginal benefits. In the United States,
transportation systems are well-developed and therefore are
not an issue. Third, Mexico has a large number of subsis-
tence farmers, especially in very poor rural areas. While
these farmers may be in dire need of other social services,
food assistance may not be needed to the same extent as in
areas without subsistence agriculture. Food assistance
administrators may therefore decide not to serve these areas.
The number of subsistence farmers in the United States is
negligible.
Negative Incentives
A government generally hopes that the vector of characteris-
tics, xi, for any household i is not affected negatively by the
targeting method, t(xi); but that occasionally happens
nonetheless. Examples of changing characteristics to receive
benefits include moving to a certain area to receive benefits
(when geographic targeting is used); cutting back on the
number of hours worked (when income cutoffs are used);
and increasing family size to receive more benefits (when
family size influences the size of benefits).
In Mexico, there is no published evidence of and little con-
cern about families that changed behavior to receive food
assistance benefits. In the United States, however, policy-
makers are concerned about the possible negative incentives
associated with welfare, including food stamps. The recent
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia-
tion Act was designed, in part, to reduce the negative incen-
tives seen by some as the source of extended welfare stays
for portions of the population. Through the TANF program,
the entitlement nature of AFDC ended. The act limits cash
assistance benefits to 5 years total in an individual’s life





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































U.S. food stamp participation rates and poverty rates, 1995, by State
Average State poverty rate is 11.3 percent
Average State participation rate is 14.8 percent
Source: U.S. Dept. of Comm., Census, and U.S. Dept. of Agr., Food and Nutrition Serv.
Note: See appendix B for more detail.and, through the increased autonomy given to States, States
can impose even stricter requirements — as little as 2 years
of receiving assistance. States also impose various rules lim-
iting benefit levels for additional children, thus reducing the
supposed incentives for mothers to have more children to
qualify for higher benefits. The Food Stamp Program
remains a federally funded entitlement program, however,
with time limits on receipt for only a small portion of eligi-
ble persons – able-bodied adults without dependents who do
not work or participate in an employment training program
and who do not live in an area with high unemployment
rates or in a labor surplus area.
Despite concern by policymakers, research has found that the
negative incentives associated with U.S. welfare programs
have a very small effect on the number of recipients and the
size of families. While hours of work were lower than they
would have been in absence of AFDC benefits, the disincen-
tives to work were calculated to have led to about a 5-percent
increase in the AFDC caseload (Moffitt, 1992; p. 17).13 Over 
time, the number of single-parent households has increased.
However, despite the claims of some policymakers, this
increase cannot be attributed to the AFDC program (Moffitt,
1992; p. 29). Relatively less work has been done on the
effect of the Food Stamp Program on labor supply and/or
family size.14 Fraker and Moffitt (1988) found that elimina-
tion of the Food Stamp Program would lead to an estimated
9-percent increase in the number of hours worked by female
heads of households. A study of married couples (Hagstrom,
1996) found that increases in food stamp benefits produce
almost no change in the number of hours worked, although
they do induce higher participation levels.
Countries can also choose targeting methods that may indi-
rectly induce positive changes in individual or household
characteristics. For example, Progresa requires medical
checkups as a condition of receipt, and WIC recipients are
strongly encouraged to seek prenatal care. The effects of
these indirect influences on recipients’ well-being is an area
in need of more research.
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14On a per person basis, other food assistance programs are probably
too small to produce labor supply changes.
13A decline in hours of work is not necessarily a negative outcome:
this allows single mothers to spend more time caring for their children. In
fact, the original intent of AFDC was to ensure single mothers did not have
to work outside the home.Effect of the Macroeconomy
By ensuring that low-income households have enough food
to eat, food assistance programs are an important component
of the social safety net in both countries. For purposes of
this report, we are concerned with two roles of the safety
net. For households that are persistently poor, even during
economic expansions, the safety net ensures them a mini-
mum standard of living. In the United States, approximately
one in three poor households have permanent incomes that
lead to poverty in every year of a 10-year time horizon
(Rodgers and Rodgers, 1992). This “chronic poverty” is par-
ticularly high for certain segments of the population, for
example, households headed by single African-American
mothers without a high school diploma. These households
have a chronic poverty rate of close to 70 percent.15 A com-
parable situation appears to exist in terms of race/ethnicity
in Mexico. Areas with high concentrations of indigenous
persons have less than one-fourth the average incomes of
areas with low concentrations. The chronic nature of this
poverty is reflected in the low human capital levels as prox-
ied for by literacy rates. In indigenous areas, 48 percent of
households are literate versus 76 percent in other areas. The
chronic nature is also reflected in the quality of residential
amenities – in indigenous areas, 16.1 percent of households
have piped water versus 62.5 percent in other areas; 48.9
percent have electricity versus 92.9 percent; and 2.2 percent
have a telephone versus 22.2 percent (Panagides, 1994, table
7.1, table 7.4, and figure 7.5). 
A second role of the social safety net is to protect families
that fall below the poverty line during economic reces-
sions.16 During an economic recession, the average income
in a country declines. While, in theory, an increase in pover-
ty does not necessarily occur if the relative distribution of
income in a country stays the same or becomes more
unequal, a falling average income does lead to an increase
in poverty. 
This inverse relation between poverty and the state of the
macroeconomy in the United States can also be seen in fig-
ure 3, which shows the poverty rate and the unemployment
rate (as economic growth declines, the unemployment rate
increases) from 1959 onwards. For example, during the pro-
longed expansion of the 1960’s, there was a steady decline
in the poverty rate, and during the recession of the early
1990’s, there was an increase in the poverty rate.17 There
has been extensive work done on the relationship between
the macroeconomy and the poverty rate. (See, for example,
Blank, 1993; Blank and Blinder, 1986; Blank and Card,
1993; and Cutler and Katz, 1991.)
Poverty rates and participation in welfare programs are gen-
erally closely related. However, poverty rates may change
without any changes in participation rates or vice-versa. For
example, a large number of eligible households do not par-
ticipate in the U.S. Food Stamp Program (Cody and Trippe,
1997). In recent years, several researchers have analyzed the
Economic Research Service/USDA A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States ❖  
15This study was based on data from 1977 to 1986.
16A safety net will also help a family facing a transitory income shock
unrelated to the macroeconomy. For example, a spouse’s departure (aban-
donment, death, divorce) from a family may lead to a temporary decline in
the family’s income.
17According to Gottschalk and Danziger, 1985, a large portion of this
decline is also due to increased transfer payments over this time period.
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Source: U.S. Dept. of Agri., Food and Nutrition Serv.effect of the macroeconomy on welfare caseloads in the
United States. This work has emerged, in part, to try to
answer the following question: Which has the larger effect
on the unprecedented decline in cash assistance caseloads –
various State-based welfare reform policies or the macro-
economic expansion? Some have argued that welfare reform
is a very important factor (Executive Office of the President,
1997; Blank, 1997) while others have argued that economic
growth swamps any influence of welfare reform (Ziliak,
Davis, and Connolly, 1997; Martini and Wiseman, 1997).18
This work was inspired by the dramatic caseload reductions
in cash assistance programs. An even greater decline has
occurred since 1994 in the Food Stamp Program. From a
record high of 27.5 million in 1994, the number of food
stamp recipients fell by more than 30 percent to 18.0 million
by mid-1999. A recent analysis by Figlio, Gundersen, and
Ziliak (2000) examined the relative contributions of the
macroeconomy and welfare reform to this decline by using
dynamic and static models with data from all 50 States and
the District of Columbia for fiscal years 1980 to 1998.19 In
their preferred dynamic model, the effect of the welfare
reform variables are very small compared with the effect of
the macroeconomic variables. From 1994 to 1998, approxi-
mately 35 percent of food stamp caseload change is due to
State differences in macroeconomic conditions (unemploy-
ment and employment-growth rates), while a very small
fraction is attributable to State-to-State differences in wel-
fare reform. State-level political factors account for about 15
percent of the caseload decline. Their work implies that a
reversal of economic fortunes will likely lead to a substan-
tial increase in food stamp cases. (Other research looking at
the effect of the macroeconomy on food stamp caseloads
include Kuhn, LeBlanc, and Gundersen, 1997; Wallace and
Blank, 1999; and Dynarski, Rangarajan, and Decker, 1991.)
These studies were primarily concerned with the determi-
nants of caseloads. In this report, we analyze the effect of
the macroeconomy on food assistance expenditures in
Mexico and the United States. Caseload dynamics is one of
the two factors influencing changes in food assistance
expenditures. The other factor is the change in the average
benefit level. While we use econometric techniques to ana-
lyze the effect of the macroeconomy on food assistance
expenditures in United States, the lack of information about
food assistance expenditures before 1989 prevents a similar
exercise for Mexico.
Total real annual food assistance expenditures in the United
States from 1970 on is seen in figure 4 (the expenditures are
deflated by the Urban Consumer Price Index (CPI-U)).
Figure 5 shows the unemployment rate and total real food
assistance expenditures. With a few exceptions, increases in
unemployment apparently coincide with increases in food
assistance expenditures. Using models akin to those used in
Kuhn, LeBlanc, and Gundersen (1997), we then isolated the
effect of various macroeconomic forces on food assistance
expenditures. The two models we used are
and
where logFAEXP is the log of real food assistance expendi-
tures (discounted by the Consumer Price Index - Urban
(CPI-U)); UN is the male unemployment rate; INFL is the
inflation rate; DGDP is the change in real GDP; and t is
time. We restricted our choice of variables and frequency of
observation (annual) such that comparable models to study
the effect of the macroeconomy on food assistance expendi-
tures in Mexico were possible. 
The results are in table 1. In model 1, the health of the
macroeconomy is measured by the unemployment rate. The
combined effect of lagged and current unemployment
implies that a 1-percent increase in the unemployment rate
leads to a 9-percent increase in food assistance expenditures
after 2 years. Consistent with the work on food stamp par-
ticipation, inflation is also positively associated with food
stamp expenditures. The steady increase in expenditures
seen in figure 5 is reflected in the importance of the year
variable.
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18Figlio and Ziliak, 1999, find that the primary difference in these con-
clusions is attributable to the types of models used. Once the dynamics of
caseloads is incorporated into models, the role of welfare reform is sharply
reduced relative to the macroeconomy.
19The static model is expressed as 
and the dynamic model is expressed as
where Cit is the natural log of per capita food stamp caseloads, URit is the
unemployment rate, EMPit is a measure of employment per capita, Wit is a
welfare reform indicator that equals the fraction of a year that “any
statewide AFDC waiver” is in effect, Bit is the real maximum AFDC/TANF
plus food stamp benefit for a family of three, Pit is a vector of variables
reflecting the political climate of a State, ABAWDit is the weighted percent-
age of a State’s population waived from work requirements for unem-
ployed able-bodied adults without dependents, EBTit is an indicator that
equals the fraction of a year that a State’s recipients received benefits via
the Electronic Benefits Transfer program, gt is a vector of year effects, di is
a time-invariant State-specific deviation from the overall constant µ,lit is a
State-specific trend, and eit is a random error. 
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U.S. real expenditures on all food assistance, food stamps, child nutrition, and WIC, 1970-98
Source:  U.S. Dept. of Agr., Food and Nutrition Serv.
Figure 5
U.S. real food assistance expenditures and the unemployment rate, 1970-98
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Unemployment rateWe use another measure of macroeconomic health, the
growth rate of GDP in model 2. Here, the effect of contem-
poraneous GDP growth rate is insignificant, but the previous
year’s growth rate is significant. The combined effect
implies that a 1-percent decrease in GDP growth rate leads
to a 7.2-percent increase in food assistance expenditures.
The effect of inflation is less in this model, but the strong
influence of time is still present.
The decomposition of food assistance expenditures in figure
4 shows that the time path of the various components of
total food assistance expenditures differs widely.20 To see
how the macroeconomy has different effects, we ran models
identical to models (1) and (2) for the three largest food
assistance programs.21 Except for contemporaneous unem-
ployment’s effect on the WIC program, the Food Stamp
Program is the only one with expenditures influenced by
either unemployment or GDP growth (table 2). A 1-percent
increase in unemployment leads to an 11.3-percent increase
in food stamp expenditures, and a 1-percent decrease in
GDP growth rates leads to a 10.2-percent increase in food
stamp expenditures. The only other variable that matters for
the other programs, in either model, is the previous period’s
expenditures. The WIC program is not an entitlement pro-
gram and, thus, does not have the capacity to expand during
economic downturns, and, even during economic expan-
sions, persons are rationed from the program. Consequently,
we may not anticipate much of an influence of the macro-
economy, and the influence of current unemployment is
unexpected.
In the United States, food assistance expenditures are counter-
cyclical (that is, increasing during economic downturns and
decreasing during expansions), but food assistance expendi-
tures in Mexico appear to be neither counter- nor procyclical.
The general pattern of real food assistance expenditures in
Mexico from 1988 to 1998 is seen in figure 6 (the figures are
deflated by the Mexican equivalent of the U.S. CPI-U).22
From 1989 to 1993, food assistance expenditures generally
declined mainly because of the decline in DICONSA expen-
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Table 1—Effect of macroeconomic variables on total real food assistance expenditures in the United
States
Variables (1) (2)
(Log of) Real food assistance expenditures in year t-1 0.238 0.615
(2.572) (5.871)
Unemployment rate in year t  .032
(3.090)
Unemployment rate in year t-1  .015
(2.426)
GDP growth rate in year t  .0014
(.303)
GDP growth rate in year t-1   -.025
(-6.112)
Inflation in year t  .022 .011
(3.347) (2.091)




Adjusted R-squared  .969 995
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of real food assistance expenditures.The Prais-Winsten correction for serially correlated residuals is used.T-statistics are
in parentheses. Please see the text for more details on the models.
20Total food assistance expenditures are broken into five components:
The Food Stamp Program and the Nutrition Assistance Programs in Puerto
Rico, the Northern Marianas, and, starting in 1996, American Samoa; all
these combined are denoted by food stamps.
The National School Lunch, School Breakfast, Child and Adult Care,
Summer Food Service, and Special Milk programs = child nutrition.
The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and
Children (WIC) and the Commodity Supplemental Food Program = WIC.
The Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations, the Nutrition
Program for the Elderly, the Disaster Feeding Program, the Emergency
Food Assistance Program, the Food Distribution Program for Charitable
Institutions and Summer Camps, and the food donation programs to soup
kitchens and food banks = food donations.
Administrative expenses. The first three are much larger than food dona-
tions and administrative expenses, so we consider only those here.
21The only difference is that the lagged term always refers to the food
assistance expenditure category itself rather than total food assistance
expenditures.
22Most of the food assistance expenditure information is from Informe
de Gobierno, 1998. Information for years before 1988 in a comparable for-
mat is not available, however. In earlier years, all food assistance expendi-
tures were subsumed under spending on a more general category of social
assistance programs (Informe de Gobierno, 1991).Economic Research Service/USDA A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States ❖  
Table 2—Effect of macroeconomic variables on food assistance expenditures in the United States 
by category of expenditure
Variables Log of real food  Log of real child  Log of real WIC 
stamp expenditures nutrition expenditures expenditures
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Log of real expenditures on 
____ in year t-1 0.167 0.389 0.594 0.605 0.722 0.843
(2.200) (6.604) (4.597) (5.776) (6.293) (8.001)
Unemployment rate in year t .056 -.0042 .118
(4.108) (-.378) (2.990)
Unemployment rate in year t-1 .044 .0081 -.0011
(2.349) (.571) (-0.251)
GDP growth rate in year t -.0024 .0092 -.025
(-.391) (1.745) (-1.184)
GDP growth rate in year t-1 -.033 -.0088 -.036
(-6.013) (-1.988) (-1.808)
Inflation in year t .029 .017 .0041 .0083 .044 .030
(3.514) (2.322) (.497) (1.236) (1.860) (1.176)
Year .038 .028 .0058 .0068 .039 .016
(6.454) (4.734) (1.204) (1.529) (1.724) (0.636)
Constant -69.274 -49.908 -8.098 -10.284 -77.203 -29.805
(-6.126) (-4.387) (-.935) (-1.256) (-1.716) (-.618)
Adjusted R-squared .976 .987 .977 .987 .901 .900
Notes: The Prais-Winsten correction for serially correlated residuals is used.T-statistics are in parentheses.The “____” in the listing of variables refers to the 
expenditures on the food assistance program displayed in the relevant column.




















Source: Informe de Gobierno.
Note: Expenditures expressed in 1994 pesos.ditures. From 1993 on, expenditures increased sharply due to
the introduction of Progresa in 1997. 
Figure 7 is comparable to figure 5 and shows the relation-
ship between the Mexican economy’s health and total food
assistance expenditures. Because the unemployment rate in
Mexico is not directly comparable to the U.S. unemploy-
ment rate, we instead show the growth rate of GDP. We also
show the inflation rate in Mexico because its level and
volatility have a large influence on the Mexican economy. 
Neither the inflation rate nor the GDP growth rate appears
to have any influence on food assistance expenditures.
During times of high inflation in 1988 and 1995, food assis-
tance expenditures were unaffected, and when GDP dropped
sharply in 1995 due to the peso devaluation in December of
1994, food assistance expenditures did not change.
Conversely, despite the high economic growth in many of
these years, expenditures did not change either. One possi-
ble explanation for this lack of influence is that Mexican
food assistance programs are primarily designed to aid those
whose depth of poverty is so great that they are unaffected
by larger economic forces and are poor for longer periods. If
this is the case, then we may not find the countercyclical
relationship found in the United States where the average
length of food stamp receipt is about 9 months (Gleason,
Schochet, and Moffitt, 1998). 
One difference between the determinants of expenditures on
food assistance programs should also be emphasized. In the
United States, the types of foods available for most food
assistance recipients are relatively unrestricted, and when
prices rise in one product, individuals (or, in the case of
school meals, school districts) can purchase lower priced
substitutes. Thus, an increase in price for any commodity
will not produce a major increase in food assistance expen-
ditures. In Mexico, however, many of the food assistance
programs are tied to one commodity. For instance, Federal
transfers for LICONSA declined in real terms in 1997 com-
pared with 1996. This is explained by a drop in the level of
international prices for dried milk as well as prices of the
main inputs used in production, rather than budget restric-
tions or domestic macroeconomic variables. However, the
decrease did not affect production and distribution of milk,
as these were maintained at the same levels as in 1996.
18 ❖  A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States Economic Research Service/USDA













Real food assistance expenditures
GDP growth rate
Figure 7
Real Mexican food assistance expenditures, inflation rate, and GDP growth rate, 1988-98
Source: Informe de Gobierno.
Note: Expenditures expressed in 1994 pesos.
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Billion pesos (percent)Food Assistance and Well-Being
The goal of most food assistance programs in both countries
is to improve the nutrition of lower income households. In
addition, by freeing up money previously allocated to food
expenditures, the well-being of households over other
dimensions may improve as well. Research on the benefits
of food assistance programs in the United States, especially
in terms of the Food Stamp Program, is more extensive than
for Mexican food assistance programs. Here we review sev-
eral studies that examine the effect of food assistance pro-
grams on food security, nutrition, and food consumption in
the United States with brief references to the available liter-
ature for Mexico. We conclude this section with a recalcula-
tion of poverty rates in Mexico after the inclusion of food
assistance benefits.
Food Assistance and Food Insecurity
In the United States, the “USDA food insufficiency ques-
tion,” one measure of food insecurity, has been included on
numerous surveys since the early 1970’s. This question asks
respondents to describe their household’s recent food intake
by responding to the following question: “Which of these
statements best describes the food eaten in your household
in the last four months?” They may choose one of four
answers: (1) “enough of the kinds of food we want to eat”;
(2) “enough but not always the kinds of food we want to
eat”; (3) “sometimes not enough to eat”; or (4) “often not
enough to eat.” Households reporting that they sometimes or
often do not get enough to eat are considered food insuffi-
cient and are asked a further question: “In what month(s)
did your household not have enough to eat?”23
Gundersen and Oliveira (1999) examined the effect of food
stamps on food insufficiency, using the above question. Out
of eligible households, 8.5 percent of participating house-
holds were food insufficient, while 4.2 percent of nonpartic-
ipants were food insufficient. On the surface, this is surpris-
ing: participants are presumed to have more resources, in
the form of food stamps, to purchase enough food to avoid
food insufficiency. However, this breakdown does not accu-
rately portray the effect of food stamps on food insufficien-
cy. Households more likely to be food insufficient, with or
without food stamps, may also be the same households more
likely to enter the program. If so, there are two main conse-
quences. First, the program is effectively targeting its bene-
fits insofar as households most in need are receiving the
benefits. Second, the positive effects of food stamps on food
insufficiency are diminished because of adverse selection.
Gundersen and Oliveira showed that with a univariate probit
model, one finds that participation in the Food Stamp
Program is associated with substantially higher probability
of being food insufficient. However, for reasons noted
above, this finding is biased if households more likely to
receive food stamps are also more likely to be food insuffi-
cient. To account for this possible endogeneity, they used a
simultaneous equation model with two probits to estimate
simultaneously the impact of participation on the food suffi-
ciency status of households and the impact of food insuffi-
ciency on the probability of participating in the program.
Results from this model indicate substantially different
results than if separate univariate probits are analyzed. In
particular, food stamps have no effect on food insufficiency,
and food insufficient households are no more likely to
receive food stamps than food sufficient households.
Households with some of the characteristics associated with
food insufficiency, though, are more likely to join the Food
Stamp Program, indicating that effective targeting exists
over this dimension. 
Two other studies also looked at the effect of food stamps
on food insufficiency. In a study of hunger among adult
patients receiving medical care in an urban hospital in
Minnesota, Nelson, Brown, and Lurie (1998) found that loss
of food stamps was a significant determinant of food insuffi-
ciency. In a study of households with incomes less than 200
percent of the poverty line, using monthly data over a 9-
month time horizon, Gundersen and Gruber (1999) found a
similar result for a wider sample. Food-insufficient house-
holds were almost three times as likely to have lost food
stamp benefits as food-sufficient households. Out of all
households in the sample, 5.9 percent had lost their food
stamp benefits. Food-insufficient households had a food
stamp loss rate of 14.8 percent, while food-sufficient house-
holds had a food stamp loss rate of 5.4 percent.
Food Assistance and Nutrition
There have been numerous studies of the effect of food
assistance programs on nutritional intake in the United
States. The studies we review all controlled for factors other
than food assistance participation. Those other factors
included income, self-selection into the programs (for rea-
sons discussed above in the context of food insecurity),
location, household size, household composition (for exam-
ple, single-parent household, dual-parent household), educa-
tion, and age. 
Studies of nutrient intake levels, all using the CSFII data set,
have found, holding all else constant, participants had higher
nutrient intake levels than eligible nonparticipants. Devaney
and Moffitt (1991) found that the marginal propensities for
low-income households to consume nutrients out of food
stamps is higher than out of cash for each of the nutrients.24
Basiotis, Kramer-LeBlanc, and Kennedy (1998) examined
the effect of food stamps and WIC on the Healthy Eating
Index (HEI), an index of overall diet quality. They found
that above some minimum food stamp benefit level, food
stamp recipients had higher HEI scores than eligible nonre-
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23Several studies have confirmed the validity of the USDA food 
sufficiency question as a measure of decreased food intake (Cristofar 
and Basiotis, 1992, and Rose and Oliveira, 1997).
24The nutrients are food energy, protein, vitamin A, vitamin C, thiamin,
riboflavin, vitamin B6, calcium, phosphorus, magnesium, and iron. They
used the 1989-90 CSFII.cipients.25 Wilde, Ranney, and McNamara (1999) found that
food stamp use leads to statistically significantly higher
intakes of meats, added sugars, and total fats, three econom-
ically efficient sources of food energy. 
Similar results held for WIC recipients.26 Oliveira and
Gundersen (1999) considered the effect of WIC on children
ages 1 to 4. They found that, with and without controlling
for possible selection bias, WIC recipients had higher nutri-
ent intakes for most nutrients than eligible nonrecipients.27
Wilde, Ranney, and McNamara (1999) found that, all else
equal, WIC recipients had lower intakes of added sugars.
Earlier studies using different methodologies have also
found improvements in nutrient intake among WIC recipi-
ents. A 1989 National WIC Evaluation found that children
receiving WIC had higher mean intakes of iron, vitamin C,
thiamin, niacin, and vitamin B6, without an increase in food
energy intake. This lack of an increase in food energy indi-
cates that there was an increase in the nutrient density of the
diet (U.S. Dept. Agr., Food and Nutrition Serv., 1989). Yip
et al. (1987) showed that the WIC program was partly
responsible for the over 60 percent decline in iron deficien-
cy anemia from 1975 to 1985. WIC also appears to increase
breast-feeding among recipients (U.S. Dept. Agr., Food and
Nutrition Serv., 1995, 1992, 1989). Other post-1980 analy-
ses of the effect of food assistance on nutrition include
Alkin et al., 1985; Butler and Raymond, 1996; and Rose,
Habicht, and Devaney, 1997.
The only studies we are aware of in Mexico regarding the
effect of food assistance programs on nutrition are a 1980
joint study by the Instituto Nacional de Nutrición and
Harvard University about the now-defunct Mexico City milk
program and a 1992 study about the distribution of dehy-
drated milk through LICONSA. Both of these found little
beneficial effects of the programs. One conclusion was that
if poorer households were reached instead of the relatively
better off households, a greater effect would have been real-
ized (Chavez et al., 1996; p. 175).
The Effect of Food Assistance Versus Cash 
on Food Consumption
There have been numerous studies comparing the relative
contribution of food stamps versus cash on the marginal
propensity to consume food (see, e.g., Fraker, Martini, and
Ohls, 1995; Levedahl, 1995; and Moffitt, 1989). Using
“cash-out experiments,” where a random sample of food
stamp recipients receive cash instead of food stamps and a
control group continues to receive food stamps, these stud-
ies found that the marginal propensity to consume food out
of food stamps was higher than out of cash. While this find-
ing may be expected for households who would spend less
on food in the absence of food stamps than they receive in
food stamps, it is unexpected for infra-marginal households
(households spending more on food than they receive in
food stamps). These infra-marginal households constitute
about 90 percent of food stamp households. Studies have
also found this for WIC (Arcia, Crouch, and Kulka, 1990).
Food Assistance and Poverty Rates
U.S. poverty rates are calculated based on households’ pre-
tax income. One common criticism of this method is that in-
kind benefits like food stamps and WIC are not included
(for example, Citro and Michael, 1995). For example, sup-
pose the Food Stamp Program expanded (as occurred in the
early 1970’s), but there was no change in the poverty rate.
The beneficial effect of expanding food stamps would thus
not be reflected. The effectiveness of in-kind benefits in
reducing poverty can be figured by the extent to which the
poverty rate is reduced when the value of in-kind benefits is
added to cash income. Using 1997 data, the U.S. poverty
rate, as measured by the head count ratio, declined by 1.4
percentage points after food assistance and housing benefits
were included (Dalaker and Naifeh, 1998; p. xv).
Two types of measures are used to characterize poverty in
Mexico. The first type uses more direct measures of well-
being. These direct measures are generally defined with
respect to housing quality and community services. These
measures generally do not use nutrition information, except
indirectly (for example, lack of running water may produce
higher rates of sickness, leading to higher malnutrition
rates), although they are probably highly correlated with
malnutrition measures. The Indice de Marginación is one
such measure. The second type of poverty measure uses
household income or expenditures. Common poverty lines
are defined as one minimum salary, two minimum salaries,
the minimum expenditures needed to purchase the most
basic needs, and the minimum expenditures needed to pur-
chase a slightly larger set of basic needs. These latter two
lines are based on baskets of goods established by the
General Coordinator for the National Plan for Marginal
Zones (COPLAMAR): the Canasta Normativa Alimentaria
(CAN) and the Canasta Normativa de Satisfactores
Esenciales (CNSE) (COPLAMAR, 1985).
We analyzed how poverty rates are affected by the inclusion
of food assistance benefits.28 We do not have data on
whether any household receives food assistance benefits;
rather, we just know the percentage of people receiving ben-
efits in every State, broken down by type of assistance. This
information is taken from the 1995 Conteo de Poblacion y
Vivienda (INEGI, 1997). From the 1994 Encuesta Nacional
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28We implicitly assume that food assistance benefits do not produce any
changes in behavior among low-income households. For more on the rea-
sons behind this assumption, see “Identification of Recipients” above.
25As opposed to other indexes that focus on nutrients, the HEI is mea-
sured almost exclusively with respect to the consumption of 10 broad cate-
gories of foods: grains, vegetables, fruit, dairy, meat, total fat, saturated fat,
cholesterol, sodium, and variety.
26In addition to positive impacts on nutrition, in comparison to non-par-
ticipants, WIC participants, ceteris paribus, have longer pregnancies, fewer
premature births, a lower incidence of moderately low and very low birth
weight, fewer infant deaths, and are more likely to receive prenatal care
(U.S. Dept. Agr., Food and Nutrition Serv., 1993, 1992).
27In the nonselection bias model, the nutrients for which WIC recipients
had higher intakes than nonrecipients are iron, vitamin C, vitamin A,
vitamin B6, and folate. In the selection bias model, the nutrients are iron,
calcium, vitamin B6, and folate.de Ingreso-Gasto de Hogares (ENIGH), though, we do have
total monetary and nonmonetary expenditure information at
the household level (INEGI, 1992). If food assistance is
received, the value of food assistance benefits per person in
a household is taken from Informe de Gobierno (1998).
Since we do not know the exact distribution of benefits, we
consider three possible distributions of benefits. 
First, we imputed the value of food assistance benefits to
households, assuming that in each State the benefits are
evenly distributed throughout the population below the
poverty line. We took the current level of benefits in each
State as reported in the CPV and assigned each poor family
an equal share of these benefits. For example, in Chiapas
where 5.68 percent of households received LICONSA and
62.39 percent of households were poor, each household was
assigned a 9.10-percent share of LICONSA benefits (62.39
percent divided by 5.68 percent).29
Second, we imputed the value of food assistance assuming
that benefits are perfectly targeted within States. Perfect tar-
geting implies that only the poorest households receive ben-
efits. For each State, we took the current number of benefi-
ciaries as reported in the CPV, but assigned benefits only to
the poorest x households, where x is the number of current
beneficiaries. Each household receiving benefits was
assigned an amount for any particular benefit equal to the
percentage of households receiving the benefit times the
value of the benefit. For example, in Chiapas, the poorest
14.03 percent of households would receive benefits, and the
remaining 85.97 percent would not. 
The third scenario does not rely on the distribution of bene-
fits by State. Instead, we assumed that benefits were perfect-
ly targeted nationally. Nationally, 20.16 percent of house-
holds received benefits in 1995, and so benefits were
assigned to the poorest 20.16 percent of households, regard-
less of their State of residence. For each of the households,
the level of benefits was assigned as in scenario 2. 
We used the following general axiomatically derived pover-
ty measure, the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke measure, for our
analysis:
where n is the total number of households, Z is the poverty
line, q is the number of households whose expenditure falls
below the poverty line, and Yi is the expenditure of the ith
household. The parameter a is greater than or equal to zero.
When a is equal to zero, all persons below the poverty line
are equally reflected in the poverty measure. When it
approaches infinity, only the income of the household with
the lowest income is reflected.
When a is zero, this equation defines the head count index.
The head count index is simply the fraction of the popula-
tion whose income falls short of the poverty line. When a is
one, the equation above defines the proportional poverty gap
(PPG). The PPG accounts for the level of income of the
poor (that is, the intensity of the poverty). The PPG weights
the head count index by the ratio of the average income
shortfall of the poor to the poverty line. When a equals two,
the equation above defines the so-called distribution sensi-
tive index. The distribution sensitive index accounts for the
severity of poverty by giving greater weight to the income
of the poorest households.30
Table 3 displays the results for the estimation of poverty
rates using the ENIGH survey data on expenditures. The
first column lists the estimates for poverty rates based on
household expenditure per capita without the inclusion of
food assistance benefits. The poverty rates for the head
count, PPG, and distribution sensitive measures are 0.286,
0.098, and 0.047 (see equation above). Under the three sce-
narios described in the previous section, the poverty esti-
mates for household expenditure per capita with the inclu-
sion of food assistance are 0.282, 0.095, and 0.045 if bene-
fits are distributed equally to all poor households (by State);
0.284, 0.096, and 0.045 if benefits are distributed to the
poorest households (by State); and 0.286, 0.095, and 0.044
if benefits are distributed to the poorest households in the
country. Below each of the rows with the poverty measures,
the decline in the poverty rate for each scenario is presented.
The absolute declines in poverty rates translate to the fol-
lowing relative declines. For scenario 1, the inclusion of
food assistance benefits implies a 1.5-percent decline in the
poverty rate for the head count measure; a 2.6-percent
decline for the poverty gap measure; and a 3.2-percent
decline for the distribution sensitive measure. For scenario
2, the relative declines are 0.6 percent, 2.0 percent, and 3.7
percent. For scenario 3, the relative declines are 0 percent,
2.8 percent, and 5.2 percent. In none of these cases is the
decline in poverty statistically significant at usual confi-
dence intervals.31
These declines in poverty rates due to the inclusion of food
assistance benefits are substantially less than in the United
States. The decline in the poverty rate in the United States is
about 10.2 percent, although this figure includes other in-
kind benefits such as housing assistance (but not medical
insurance). Two primary differences between food assis-
tance programs in the two countries may explain the smaller
effect on poverty in Mexico. First, the level of benefits as a
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29Consistent with the discussion of benefits above, the actual amount of
LICONSA benefits assigned depends on the number of children below the
age of 12. A household with no children, for example, would not get 
benefits.
30For greater details on the data sets used, the assumptions used to
impute benefits, the methods of calculating levels of benefits, the poverty
measures, and an analysis broken down by food assistance program, see
Gundersen and Kelly, 1999.
31To calculate the t-statistics in tables 3 and 4, we used a technique
derived from Kakwani, 1993. The t-statisic is
di=r(v-1)+1, i=1,2 and, where di is the design effect for the ith sample, r
















































































ss s Spercentage of income is much lower in Mexico. In the
United States, the nominal value of food stamps can be as
much as 50 percent of a household’s income (Ohls and
Beebout, 1993). In Mexico, under the assumption that a
household receives benefits from every food assistance pro-
gram, the average family below the poverty line receiving
food assistance in an urban area would receive a maximum
of 3.8 percent of its total expenditures in food assistance
benefits and the average rural family would receive a maxi-
mum of 5.1 percent. 
Second, a far larger percentage of people participate in the
United States. In 1997, over 90 percent of households with
positive incomes below the poverty line participated in the
Food Stamp Program (Castner and Cody, 1999, table 4).32
Using the figures from the CPV, in Mexico less than 70 per-
cent of the low-income population participates in a food assis-
tance program. These differences can be ascribed to the tar-
geting methods used in the countries – in the United States
there is no geographic targeting and any income-eligible
household can participate, while in Mexico, a person could be
income-eligible but not live in a geographically targeted area. 
For a comparison with the United States, we now consider
how poverty rates would differ in Mexico under the supposi-
tion that food assistance benefits were expanded in both
these directions; that is, if average benefits and  participation
rates were both increased. We simulate three cases with
higher average benefit levels and three cases with higher
participation rates. The results are displayed in table 4. 
To simulate the effect on poverty rates of higher average
benefit levels, we assume that Mexico implements 10-, 25-,
and 50-percent increases in the benefits of each program.
With a 10-percent increase in benefits, for scenario 1, the
inclusion of food assistance benefits implies a 1.6-percent
decline in the poverty rate for the head count measure; a
2.8-percent decline for the poverty gap measure; and a 3.7-
percent decline for the distribution sensitive measure. For
scenario 2, the relative declines are 0.7 percent, 2.3 percent,
and 4.1 percent. For scenario 3, the relative declines are 0
percent, 3.1 percent, and 5.6 percent. With a 50-percent
increase in benefits, for scenario 1, the inclusion of food
assistance benefits implies a 2.3-percent decline in the
poverty rate for the head count measure; a 4.0-percent
decline for the poverty gap measure; and a 4.7-percent
decline for the distribution sensitive measure. For scenario
2, the relative declines are 0.9 percent, 3.1 percent, and 5.4
percent and for scenario 3, the relative declines are 0 per-
cent, 4.2 percent, and 7.8 percent.33 (The preceding declines
are based on the results in table 4.)
To simulate the effect on poverty rates of an expansion in
the number of beneficiaries, we assume, as above, that
Mexico implements 10-, 25-, and 50-percent increases.
Because the scenario of assigning equal benefits to all poor
households in a State does not make sense in this context,
we only consider the cases of assigning benefits to the poor-
est households by State and in the country. For all scenarios
and poverty measures, the decline in poverty is smaller due
to expansion in the number of recipients than due to expan-
sion in benefit levels. The difference can be quite stark in
the case of a 50-percent increase: for scenario 2 under the
distribution-sensitive measure, the decline is 25 percent
greater for an increase in benefit levels, and for scenario 3
under the distribution-sensitive measure, almost 40 percent
greater. These large differences are probably due to the large
number of nonpoor recipients in major population centers
such as the Distrito Federal, where 28 percent of households
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Table 3—Poverty rates with and without food assistance benefits, Mexico
Food assistance distribution scenarios
Poverty measure Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Equal distribution to Distribution to poorest Distribution to poorest
all poor households (by State) households (by State) households (for country)
Head count (a=0) 0.2815 0.2843 0.2860
Change in poverty rates due .0044 .0017 0
to benefits (.500) (.173) (0)
Poverty gap (a=1) .0952 .0956 .0949
Change in poverty rates due .0025 .0020 .0027
to benefits (.595) (.484) (.653)
Distribution sensitive (a=2) .044 .0447 .0441
Change in poverty rates due .0015 .0017 .0024
to benefits (.617) (.693) (.976)
Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses.The poverty rates without food assistance benefits for the poverty measures are 0.2860 (a=0), 0.0976 (a=1), 
and 0.0465 (a=2).
32Other food assistance programs have even higher participation rates
among poor households.
33For the head-count and poverty-gap poverty measures, the decline in
poverty is not significant at usual confidence intervals for any of these
increases, irrespective of the targeting assumptions. This is also true for 10-
and 25-percent increases for the distribution sensitive measure. With a 50-
percent increase in benefits, the decline in poverty is statistically significant
(at the 10-percent level) for the distribution sensitive measure under the
assumption that benefits are targeted to the poorest households in the 
country.are poor but 36 percent of residents participate in at least
one food assistance program. When the number of benefi-
ciaries increases in these areas, there is no decrease in the
poverty rates because the incomes of nonpoor households
are not reflected in these poverty measures. If Mexico is
interested in expanding its food assistance programs and the
goal is reduction of poverty, expanding the benefit level
would be much more effective than expanding the number
of beneficiaries.
We recognize that food assistance programs are not income
transfer programs, rather they are nutrition supplement pro-
grams. Insofar as the poverty rate is a proxy for the extent of
deprivation over more direct measures of well-being (such
as nutrition), this recalculation of poverty rates measures the
decrease in deprivation due to food assistance benefits. The
effects on nutrition may differ.
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Table 4—Simulations of changes in poverty rates in Mexico due to increases in benefit levels and number
of recipients
Food assistance distribution scenarios
Poverty measure [1] [2] [3]
Equal distribution to all Distribution to poorest Distribution to poorest 
poor households (by State) households (by State) households (for Country)
Change in poverty rates due to benefits
10-percent increase in benefit levels
Head count (a=0) 0.0047 0.0020 0
(.482) (.197) (0)
Poverty gap (a=1) .0027 .0022 .0030
(.653) (.533) (.719)
Distribution sensitive (a=2) .0017 .0019 .0026
(.676) (.763) (1.074)
10-percent increase in number of recipients
Head count (a=0) 0020 0
(.205) (0)
Poverty gap (a=1) .0023 .0030
(.552) (.714)
Distribution sensitive (a=2) .0019 .0025
(.757) (1.006)
25-percent increase in benefit levels
Head count (a=0) .0057 .0022 0
(.577) (.221) (0)
Poverty gap (a=1) .0031 .00025 .0033
(.738) (.606) (.818)
Distribution sensitive (a=2) .0019 .0021 .0030
(.764) (.867) (1.221)
25-percent increase in number of recipients
Head count (a=0) .0023 0
(.237) (0)
Poverty gap (a=1) .0025 .0033
(.600) (.804)
Distribution sensitive (a=2) .0020 .0025
(.808) (1.034)
50-percent increase in benefit levels
Head count (a=0) .0065 .0025 0
(.656) (.252) (0)
Poverty gap (a=1) .0037 .0030 .0041
(.880) (.727) (.985)
Distribution sensitive (a=2) .0022 .0025 .0036
(.910) (1.040) (1.467)
50-percent increase in number of recipients
Head count (a=0) .0023 .0031
(.237) (.316)
Poverty gap (a=1) .0025 .0036
(.600) (.864)
Distribution sensitive (a=2) .0020 .0026
(.808) (1.050)
Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses.Conclusion
Food assistance programs in Mexico and the United States
are in some ways quite similar. In both countries, identifica-
tion methods use information about households and/or indi-
viduals;  the programs are financed internally; and an
improvement in the nutritional quality of diets (especially
for children) is the primary goal of the many different pro-
grams. This similarity allows for comparisons among pro-
grams in the countries. In this report, we considered three
critical elements to any analysis of food assistance pro-
grams: the methods of targeting, the influence of macroeco-
nomic conditions on total expenditures, and the effect of
food assistance benefits on well-being. We now consider
two examples of how insights from one country can be
applied to the food assistance programs of the other country.
While both countries identify recipients based on household
criteria, Mexico generally uses a two-stage procedure
whereby areas in need of food assistance are first identified
and then families within those areas are identified. In the
United States, regions are not used in the identification pro-
cedure. Poverty is, however, sometimes concentrated in spe-
cific geographic areas, especially in parts of the rural deep
south, Appalachia, on Indian reservations, and in some cen-
tral cities. U.S. researchers could use the methods developed
by Mexican food assistance programs to more effectively
aid beneficiaries, especially when the programs have large
fixed administrative costs. This is particularly true in terms
of outreach programs and, perhaps, setting higher benefit
levels for certain areas.
The effects of food assistance programs on individuals’
well-being can be measured in the United States because
surveys include relevant questions about food assistance
receipt, food insecurity status, and food intakes.
Unfortunately, information on food assistance receipt disag-
gregated to the household level is not available for Mexico,
although it is available at more aggregated levels. Also,
information on food insecurity status and food intakes in
Mexico is available neither at the household level nor at
more aggregated levels.34 Because sound theoretical frame-
works and econometric methods are well-developed, the
inclusion of such questions would enable thorough studies
of the effects of food assistance benefits in Mexico.
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34Surveys in Mexico do ask extensive questions about housing quality
and the availability of services such as electricity and running water.References
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Mexican food assistance participation rates and poverty rates, 1995, by State
State Share who are poor       Share receiving food assistance      
                                                  Percent
Baja California (Norte) 20.5 5.2
Baja California Sur 27.4 18.2
Distrito Federal 27.5 36.1





Quintana Roo 33.3 19.4























Source:  Conteo de Población y Vivienda.
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Appendix Table B
U.S. food stamp participation rates and poverty rates, 1995, by State
State     Share who are poor Share receiving food stamps
                                         Percent






North Dakota  6.4 12.2
Massachusetts 6.4 11.1
Colorado 6.5 9.2
South Dakota 6.7 14.2
Idaho 6.7 13.7
Minnesota 6.7 9.5










North Carolina 8.3 12.1
Washington 8.6 11.2
Oregon 8.9 11.5
Rhode Island  9.2 11.5




















New Mexico 14.0 24.0
Louisiana 16.0 18.8
West Virginia 16.5 17.2
D.C. 17.1 22.7
Mississippi 17.5 20.2
Source:  U.S. Dept. Comm., Census Bur., and the U.S. Dept. Agr., Food and Nutrition Serv.